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Abstract
We study the impact of research collaborations in coauthorship networks on total research
output. Through the links in the collaboration network researchers create spillovers not only
to their direct coauthors but also to researchers indirectly linked to them. We characterize the
interior equilibrium when multiple agents spend effort in multiple, possibly overlapping projects,
and there are interaction effects in the cost of effort.
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1. Introduction
We build a micro-founded model of scientific co-authorship that incorporates and generalizes
previous ones in the literature [cf. e.g. Ballester et al., 2006; Cabrales et al., 2010; Jackson
and Wolinsky, 1996]. We characterize the interior equilibrium when multiple agents spend
effort in multiple, possibly overlapping projects, and there are interaction effects in the cost of
effort. While we assume that the allocation of agents into different projects is exogenous (and
determined by some underlying meeting process), the endogenous choice of efforts makes the
network of positive efforts endogenous, and in this sense we consider an endogenous network
formation model. The equilibrium solution to this model then allows us to study the impact of
individual researchers on total research output.
There exists a growing literature, both empirical and theoretical, on coauthorship networks
including Bosquet and Combes [2013]; Ductor [2011]; Ductor et al. [2013]; Fafchamps et al.
[2010]; Goyal et al. [2006], Newman [2001a,b,c,d, 2004], Ko¨nig [2011], Ballester et al. [2006];
Cabrales et al. [2010]; Calvo´-Armengol et al. [2009], Azoulay et al. [2010]; Waldinger [2010,
2012] and Ko¨nig et al. [2014]; Liu et al. [2011]. In particular, our paper is related to the
recent ones by Baumann [2014] and Salonen [2014], where agents choose time to invest into
bilateral relationships. Our model extends the setups considered in these papers to allow for
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investments into multiple projects involving more than two agents. Moreover, Bimpikis et al.
[2014] analyze firms competing in quantities a` la Cournot across different markets with a similar
linear-quadratic payoff specification, and allow firms to choose endogenously the quantitites sold
to each market. In contrast, the efforts invested by the agents in different projects in our model
are strategic complements, and not substitutes as in their paper.
2. Production Function
Assume that there are s = 1, . . . , p research projects. Let the production function for project s
be given by
Ys(G, es) =
∑
i∈Ns
αieis +
β
2
∑
i∈Ns
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
eisejs =
∑
i∈Ns
eis

αi + β
2
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs

 , (1)
where eis is the research effort of agent i in project s, Ns is the set of agents participating
in project s, αi is the ability/skill of researcher i and β is a spillover parameter from comple-
mentarities between the research efforts of coauthors. If efforts are measured in logs then Ys
corresponds to a translog production function [cf. Christensen et al., 1973, 1975]. The translog
production function can be viewed as an exact production function, a second order Taylor ap-
proximation to a more general production function or a second order approximation to a CES
production function [cf. Adams, 2006].1
3. Payoffs
In the following we study two alternative payoff specifications.2 The assumption of a convex
separable cost is similar to the model studied in Adams [2006]. The introduction of a quadratic
cost with substitutes or complements, depending on the sign of the parameters φss′ , is similar
to Cohen-Cole et al. [2012], and it includes the case of a convex total cost as a special case when
φs,s′ = γ, and the the case of a convex separable cost when φs,s′ = γδs,s′ . A theoretical model
with only two activities is studied in Belhaj and Dero¨ıan [2014], and an empirical analysis is
provided in Liu [2014].
1A related specification, however, without allowing agents to spend effort across different projects, can be
found in Ballester et al. [2006].
2Table 1 gives an overview of possible extensions and alternative specifications.
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3.1. Convex Separable Costs
The payoff of agent i is given by
πi(G, e) =
p∑
s=1
(
Ys(G, es)−
γ
2
e2is
)
δis
=
p∑
s=1

∑
j∈Ns
αjejs +
β
2
∑
j∈Ns
∑
k∈Ns\{j}
ejseks −
γ
2
e2is

 δis
=
p∑
s=1

∑
j∈Ns
ejs

αj + β
2
∑
k∈Ns\{j}
eks

− γ
2
e2is

 δis, (2)
where ns = |Ns| is the number of agents participating in project s, and it holds that ns =∑n
i=1 δis with δis ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether i is participating in project s.
Proposition 1. Let the payoff function for each agent i = 1, . . . , n be given by Equation (2).
Then the unique interior Nash equilibrium effort levels are given by
eis =
αi
β + γ
+
β
(β + γ)(γ − β(ns − 1))
∑
j∈Ns
αj. (3)
for each agent i = 1, . . . , n and each project s = 1, . . . , p.
Inserting effort levels from Equation (21) into the production function from Equation (1)
yields
Ys(G) =
∑
i∈Ns
eis

αi + β
2
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs


=
1
2
∑
i∈Ns
eis (αi + γeis)
=
1
2
∑
i∈Ns
(
αieis + γe
2
is
)
=
1
2
∑
i∈Ns

αi

 αi
β + γ
+
β
γ − β(ns − 1)
∑
j∈Ns
αj
β + γ

+ γ

 αi
β + γ
+
β
γ − β(ns − 1)
∑
j∈Ns
αj
β + γ


2
 .
(4)
The model in this section assumes that efforts invested by an agent across different projects
are independent. This assumption is relaxed in the more general setup analyzed in the following
section.
3.2. Quadratic Costs with Substitutes/Complements
In the following we introduce a cost given by the quadratic form, 12
∑p
s,s′=1 φs,s′eiseis′δisδis′ =
1
2 e˜
⊤
i φe˜i, where φs,s′ = φs′,s, e˜i = (e˜i1, . . . , e˜ip)
⊤ and e˜is = eisδis. This cost is convex if and
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only if the p × p matrix φ is positive definite. The case of a quadratic cost includes the case
of a convex total cost as a special case when φs,s′ = γ, and the case of a convex separable cost
discussed in Section 3.1 when φs,s′ = γδs,s′ .
The payoff of agent i is given by
πi(G, e) =
p∑
s=1
Ys(G, es)δis −
1
2
p∑
s,s′=1
φs,s′eiseis′δisδis′
=
p∑
s=1

∑
j∈Ns
αjejs +
β
2
∑
j∈Ns
∑
k∈Ns\{j}
ejseks

 δis − 1
2
p∑
s,s′=1
φs,s′eiseis′δisδis′
=
p∑
s=1

∑
j∈Ns
ejs

αj + β
2
∑
k∈Ns\{j}
eks



 δis − 1
2
p∑
s,s′=1
φs,s′eiseis′δisδis′ , (5)
where ns = |Ns| is the number of agents participating in project s, and it holds that ns =∑n
i=1 δis with δis ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether i is participating in project s.
Proposition 2. Let the payoff function for each agent i = 1, . . . , n be given by Equation (5)
and assume that
φss′ =

γ, if s
′ = s,
ρ, otherwise.
Denote by
ϕis ≡
ρβδis
(β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
,
µs(α) ≡
n∑
i=1
ραidiδis
(β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
−
1
β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ
n∑
i=1
αiδis,
ωss′ ≡
n∑
i=1
ϕisδis′ .
Further, let Ω ≡ (ωss′)1≤s,s′≤p, assume that the matrix Ip − Ω is invertible, and define by
ǫ ≡ (Ip − Ω)
−1µ(α). Then, for β small enough, the unique interior Nash equilibrium effort
levels are given by
eis =
1
β + γ − ρ
[
βǫs + αi −
ρ
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
(
p∑
s′=1
δis′ǫs′ + αidi
)]
, (6)
if δis = 1 for each agent i = 1, . . . , n and each project s = 1, . . . , p. Further, the total effort
spent in project s is given by ǫs.
4
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Figure 1: The network analyzed in Example 1. The effort levels of the individual agents for each project they
are involved in are indicate next to the nodes.
Inserting Equation (6) into the production function from Equation (1) gives
Ys(G) =
∑
i∈Ns
αieis + β
∑
i∈Ns
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
eisejs
=
∑
i∈Ns
eis

αi + β ∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs


=
∑
i∈Ns
δis
β + γ − ρ
[
βǫs + αi −
ρ
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
(
p∑
s′=1
δis′ǫs′ + αidi
)]
×

αi + β
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
δjs
β + γ − ρ
[
βǫs + αj −
ρ
β + γ + ρ(dj − 1)
(
p∑
s′=1
δjs′ǫs′ + αjdj
)]
 .
(7)
We will illustrate the equilibrium characterization of Proposition 2 in several examples that
follow.
Example 1. Consider a network with 2 projects and 3 agents, where in the first project agents 1
and 2 are collaborating and in the second project agents 1 and 3 are collaborating. An illustration
can be found in Figure 1. The payoffs of the agents are given by
π1 = e11
(
α1 +
β
2
e21
)
+ e21
(
α2 +
β
2
e11
)
+ e12
(
α1 +
β
2
e32
)
+ e32
(
α3 +
β
2
e12
)
−
γ
2
e211 −
γ
2
e212 − ρe11e12
π2 = e11
(
α1 +
β
2
e21
)
+ e21
(
α2 +
β
2
e11
)
−
γ
2
e221
π3 = e12
(
α1 +
β
2
e32
)
+ e32
(
α3 +
β
2
e12
)
−
γ
2
e232.
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The first order conditions are given by
∂π1
∂e11
= α1 + e21β − e11γ − e12ρ = 0
∂π1
∂e12
= α1 + e32β − e12γ − e11ρ = 0
∂π2
∂e21
= α2 + e11β − e21γ = 0
∂π3
∂e32
= α3 + e12β − e32γ = 0.
Solving this system of equations directly yields
e11 = −
(β − γ)(β + γ)(α2β + α1γ) + γ(α3β + α1γ)ρ
(β2 − γ2)2 − γ2ρ2
,
e12 = −
(β − γ)(β + γ)(α3β + α1γ) + γ(α2β + α1γ)ρ
(β2 − γ2)2 − γ2ρ2
,
e21 = −
(β − γ)(β + γ)(α1β + α2γ) + β(α3β + α1γ)ρ+ α2γρ
2
(β2 − γ2)2 − γ2ρ2
,
e32 = −
(β − γ)(β + γ)(α1β + α3γ) + β(α2β + α1γ)ρ+ α3γρ
2
(β2 − γ2)2 − γ2ρ2
. (8)
Next, we compute the above equilibrium effort levels using the equilibrium characterization in
Equation (6). Note that d = (di)1≤i≤3 = (2, 1, 1)
⊤, n = (ns)1≤s≤2 = (2, 2)
⊤,
δ = (δis)1≤i≤3,1≤s≤2 =


1 1
1 0
0 1

 ,
and
ϕ = (ϕis)1≤i≤3,1≤s≤2 =


βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β+γ)(β−γ+ρ) 0
0 βρ(β+γ)(β−γ+ρ)

 .
Further, we have that α = (α1, α2, α3)
⊤ and
µ(α) =


α2
(
−1+ ρ
β+γ
)
+α1
(
−1+ 2ρ
β+γ+ρ
)
β−γ+ρ
α3
(
−1+ ρ
β+γ
)
+α1
(
−1+ 2ρ
β+γ+ρ
)
β−γ+ρ

 .
Next, we have that
Ω =
(
βρ(2(β+γ)+ρ)
(β+γ)(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ(2(β+γ)+ρ)
(β+γ)(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
)
,
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Figure 2: Equilibrium effort levels for agent 1 with α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.1, α3 = 0.9, ρ = 0.05 (left panel), ρ = 0.25
(right panel) and γ = 1.
and hence
ǫ = (I2 −Ω)
−1µ(α) =

 (α1+α2)(β−γ)(β+γ)2+(β+γ)(α3β+α1γ)ρ+α2γρ2γ2ρ2−(β2−γ2)2
(α1+α3)(β−γ)(β+γ)2+(β+γ)(α2β+α1γ)ρ+α3γρ2
γ2ρ2−(β2−γ2)2

 .
Inserting the above expressions into Equation (6) yields exactly the equilibrium effort levels of
Equation (8). An illustration of the equilibrium effort levels for agent 1 with α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.1,
α3 = 0.9, γ = 1 and two different values of ρ = 0.05 and ρ = 0.25 is shown in Figure 2. We
observe that with increasing values of β the effort spent by agent 1 on project 2 is increasing
more that the effort spent on project 1. The reason is that with increasing β the complementarity
effects between efforts of collaborating agents become stronger, and this effect is more pronounced
for the collaboration of agent 1 with the more productive agent 3, than with the less productive
agent 2. Moreover, when the cost parameter ρ is high enough, then agent 1 may even spend less
effort in equilibrium in the project with agent 1 than for higher values of β than for low values
of β.
Example 2. Consider a network with 2 projects and 4 agents, where in the first project agents
1, 2 and 3 are collaborating while in the second project agents 2 and 4 are collaborating. An
illustration can be found in Figure 3. The payoffs of the agents are given by
π1 = e11
(
α1 +
β
2
(e21 + e31)
)
+ e21
(
α2 +
β
2
(e11 + e31)
)
+ e31
(
α3 +
β
2
(e11 + e21)
)
−
γ
2
e211
π2 = e21
(
α2 +
β
2
(e11 + e31)
)
+ e11
(
α1 +
β
2
(e21 + e31)
)
+ e31
(
α3 +
β
2
(e11 + e21)
)
+ e22
(
α2 +
β
2
e42
)
+ e42
(
α4 +
β
2
e22
)
−
γ
2
e221 −
γ
2
e222 − ρe21e22
π3 = e31
(
α3 +
β
2
(e11 + e21)
)
+ e11
(
α1 +
β
2
(e21 + e31)
)
+ e21
(
α2 +
β
2
(e11 + e31)
)
−
γ
2
e231
π4 = e42
(
α4 +
β
2
e22
)
+ e22
(
α2 +
β
2
e42
)
−
γ
2
e242.
7
1(
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0
)
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(
e31
0
)
1
4
(
0
e42
)
1
1
2
Figure 3: The network analyzed in Example 2. The effort levels of the individual agents for each project they
are involved in are indicate next to the nodes.
The first order conditions are given by
∂π1
∂e11
= α1 + (e21 + e31)β − e11γ = 0
∂π2
∂e21
= α2 + (e11 + e31)β − e21γ − e22ρ = 0
∂π2
∂e22
= α2 + e42β − e22γ − e21ρ = 0
∂π3
∂e31
= α3 + (e11 + e21)β − e31γ = 0
∂π4
∂e42
= α4 + e22β − e42γ = 0.
Solving this system of equations directly yields
e11 =
(−(α2 + α3)β + α1(β − γ))(β − γ)(β + γ)
2 − β(β + γ)(α4β + α2γ)ρ− γ(α3β + α1γ)ρ
2
(β − γ)(β + γ) ((2β − γ)(β + γ)2 + γρ2)
,
e21 =
−(β + γ)((α1 − α2 + α3)β + α2γ) + (α4β + α2γ)ρ
(2β − γ)(β + γ)2 + γρ2
,
e22 = −
(2β − γ)(β + γ)(α4β + α2γ) + γ((α1 − α2 + α3)β + α2γ)ρ
(β − γ) ((2β − γ)(β + γ)2 + γρ2)
,
e31 = −
(β − γ)(β + γ)2((α1 + α2 − α3)β + α3γ) + β(β + γ)(α4β + α2γ)ρ+ γ(α1β + α3γ)ρ
2
(β − γ)(β + γ) ((2β − γ)(β + γ)2 + γρ2)
,
e42 =
−(2β − γ)(β + γ)(α2β + α4γ)− β((α1 − α2 + α3)β + α2γ)ρ+ α4(β − γ)ρ
2
(β − γ) ((2β − γ)(β + γ)2 + γρ2)
. (9)
Next, we compute the above equilibrium effort levels using the equilibrium characterization in
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Equation (6). Note that d = (di)1≤i≤3 = (1, 2, 1, 1)
⊤, n = (ns)1≤s≤2 = (2, 2)
⊤,
δ = (δis)1≤i≤3,1≤s≤2 =


1 0
1 1
1 0
0 1

 ,
and
ϕ = (ϕis)1≤i≤3,1≤s≤2 =


βρ
(β+γ)(2β−γ+ρ) 0
βρ
(2β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β+γ)(2β−γ+ρ) 0
0 βρ(β+γ)(β−γ+ρ)

 .
Further, we have that α = (α1, α2, α3, α4)
⊤ and
µ(α) =

 −(α1+α2+α3)(β+γ)
2+α2(β+γ)ρ+(α1+α3)ρ2
(β+γ)(2β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
α4
(
−1+ ρ
β+γ
)
+α2
(
−1+ 2ρ
β+γ+ρ
)
β−γ+ρ

 .
Next, we have that
Ω =
(
βρ(3(β+γ)+2ρ)
(β+γ)(2β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(2β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ(2(β+γ)+ρ)
(β+γ)(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
)
,
and hence
ǫ = (I2 −Ω)
−1µ(α) =
(
− (α1+α2+α3)(β−γ)(β+γ)
2+(β+γ)(α4β+α2γ)ρ+(α1+α3)γρ2
(β−γ)((2β−γ)(β+γ)2+γρ2)
−(α2+α4)(2β−γ)(β+γ)2−(β+γ)((α1−α2+α3)β+α2γ)ρ+α4(β−γ)ρ2
(β−γ)((2β−γ)(β+γ)2+γρ2)
)
.
Inserting the above expressions into Equation (6) yields exactly the equilibrium effort levels of
Equation (9). An example of the equilibrium effort levels for agents 3 and 4 is shown in Figure
4. The figure illustrates that with differently skilled agents, the effort of an agent in one project
might exceed the effort in another project when the complementarity parameter β increases.
Example 3. Consider a network with 3 projects and 3 agents, where in the first project agents
1 and 2 are collaborating, in the second project agents 1 and 3 are collaborating and in the third
project agents 2 and 3 are collaborating. An illustration can be found in Figure 5. The payoffs
of the agents are given by
π1 = e11
(
α1 +
β
2
e21
)
+ e21
(
α2 +
β
2
e11
)
+ e12
(
α1 +
β
2
e32
)
+ e32
(
α3 +
β
2
e12
)
−
γ
2
e211 −
γ
2
e212 − ρe11e12
π2 = e11
(
α1 +
β
2
e21
)
+ e21
(
α2 +
β
2
e11
)
+ e23
(
α2 +
β
2
e33
)
+ e33
(
α3 +
β
2
e23
)
−
γ
2
e221 −
γ
2
e223 − ρe21e23
π3 = e32
(
α3 +
β
2
e12
)
+ e12
(
α1 +
β
2
e32
)
+ e33
(
α3 +
β
2
e23
)
+ e23
(
α2 +
β
2
e33
)
−
γ
2
e232 −
γ
2
e233 − ρe32e33.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium effort levels for agents 3 and 4 with ρ = 0.05, γ = 1, α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.1, α3 = 0.9, α4 = 0.5
in the left panel, while α1 = 0.25, α2 = 0.25, α3 = 0.25, α4 = 0.5 in the right panel.
1

e11e12
0


2

e210
e23


3

 0e32
e33


1
2
3
Figure 5: The network analyzed in Example 3. The effort levels of the individual agents for each project they
are involved in are indicate next to the nodes.
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The first order conditions are given by
∂π1
∂e11
= α1 + e21β − e11γ − e12ρ = 0
∂π1
∂e12
= α1 + e32β − e12γ − e11ρ = 0
∂π2
∂e21
= α2 + e11β − e21γ − e23ρ = 0
∂π2
∂e23
= α2 + e33β − e23γ − e21ρ = 0
∂π3
∂e32
= α3 + e12β − e32γ − e33ρ = 0
∂π3
∂e33
= α3 + e23β − e33γ − e32ρ = 0.
Solving this system of equations directly yields
e11 = −
(β − γ)(α2β + α1γ) + α3βρ+ α1ρ
2
(β − γ − ρ) (β2 − γ2 + βρ+ ρ2)
,
e12 = −
(β − γ)(α3β + α1γ) + α2βρ+ α1ρ
2
(β − γ − ρ) (β2 − γ2 + βρ+ ρ2)
,
e21 = −
(β − γ)(α1β + α2γ) + α3βρ+ α2ρ
2
(β − γ − ρ) (β2 − γ2 + βρ+ ρ2)
,
e23 = −
(β − γ)(α3β + α2γ) + α1βρ+ α2ρ
2
(β − γ − ρ) (β2 − γ2 + βρ+ ρ2)
,
e32 = −
(β − γ)(α1β + α3γ) + α2βρ+ α3ρ
2
(β − γ − ρ) (β2 − γ2 + βρ+ ρ2)
,
e33 = −
(β − γ)(α2β + α3γ) + α1βρ+ α3ρ
2
(β − γ − ρ) (β2 − γ2 + βρ+ ρ2)
. (10)
Next, we compute the above equilibrium effort levels using the equilibrium characterization in
Equation (6). Note that d = (di)1≤i≤3 = (2, 2, 2)
⊤, n = (ns)1≤s≤3 = (2, 2, 2)
⊤,
δ = (δis)1≤i≤3,1≤s≤3 =


1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1

 ,
and
ϕ = (ϕis)1≤i≤3,1≤s≤3 =


βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ) 0
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ) 0
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
0 βρ(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)

 .
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Figure 6: Total equilibrium effort levels, e+s =
∑p
i=1 eisδis, for projects 1, 2 and 3 with γ = 1, α1 = 0.25,
α2 = 0.5, α3 = 0.75 and varying values of β in the left panel, and varying values of ρ in the right panel.
Further, we have that α = (α1, α2, α3)
⊤ and
µ(α) =


− (α1+α2)(β+γ−ρ)(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
− (α1+α3)(β+γ−ρ)(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
− (α2+α3)(β+γ−ρ)(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)

 .
Next, we have that
Ω =


2βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
2βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)
2βρ
(β−γ+ρ)(β+γ+ρ)

 ,
and hence
ǫ = (I2 −Ω)
−1µ(α) =


− (α1+α2)(β−γ)(β+γ)+2α3βρ+(α1+α2)ρ
2
(β−γ−ρ)(β2−γ2+βρ+ρ2)
− (α1+α3)(β−γ)(β+γ)+2α2βρ+(α1+α3)ρ
2
(β−γ−ρ)(β2−γ2+βρ+ρ2)
− (α2+α3)(β−γ)(β+γ)+2α1βρ+(α2+α3)ρ
2
(β−γ−ρ)(β2−γ2+βρ+ρ2)

 .
Inserting the above expressions into Equation (6) yields exactly the equilibrium effort levels of
Equation (10). The total equilibrium effort levels for projects 1, 2 and 3 are shown in Figure 6
for varying values of β and ρ.
A more compact characterization of the equilibrium effort levels of Proposition 2 can be
obtained in the special case of complete network [cf. e.g. Salonen, 2014]. Assume that δis = 1
for all i = 1, . . . , n. From Equation (25) we then get
p∑
s′=1
eis′φs′,sδisδis′ = αiδis + β
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejsδjsδis, (11)
for i = 1, . . . , n and s = 1, . . . , p. Let es = [e1sδ1s, . . . , ensδns]
⊤ be a vector of effort levels
that agents 1, . . . , n put into project s. Let E = [e1, . . . , ep] be the n× p matrix with columns
given by es for s = 1, . . . , p. Further, denote by wij,s = δisδjs for i 6= j and wii,s = 0, and let
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Ws = [wij,s]1≤i,j≤n be an n × n matrix with elements wij,s ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether agents
i and j are participating in project s. Moreover, we denote by α˜is = αiδis, αs = (α˜1s, . . . , α˜ns)
and let A = [α1, . . . ,αp] be the n × p matrix with columns given by αs. Then we can write
Equation (26) in matrix form as follows
Eφ = A+ β[W1e1, . . . ,Wpep]. (12)
Note that the n × p matrix [W1e1, . . . ,Wpep] is composed of n × 1 column vectors Wses for
s = 1, . . . , p. We next apply a vectorization to both sides of Equation (12) to obtain3
vec(Eφ) = vec(A) + β


W1e1
W2e2
...
Wpep

 . (13)
Using the fact that
vec(Eφ) = (φ⊗ In)vec(E),
and 

W1e1
W2e2
...
Wpep

 =


W1 0 · · ·
0 W2
0 · · ·
. . .
0 · · · Wp




e1
e2
...
ep

 = diag(Ws)ps=1vec(E),
we can write Equation (13) as follows
(φ⊗ In)vec(E) = vec(A) + βdiag(Ws)
p
s=1vec(E). (14)
Next, denoting by e = vec(E), W = diag(Ws)
p
s=1 and α = vec(A), we can write Equation (14)
as
(φ⊗ In)e = α+ βWe. (15)
When the matrix (φ ⊗ In + βW)
−1 is invertible, we then obtain the equilibrium effort levels
given by
e = (φ ⊗ In + βW)
−1α. (16)
An alternative compact form of the equilibrium effort levels can be obtain using the line
3For example, for the 2× 2 matrix
[
a b
c d
]
, the vectorization is vec(A) =


a
c
b
d

 [cf. e.g. Dhrymes, 1984, Chap.
4].
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1 2 3
1 2 3 e11 e12 e32
e33e23e21
Figure 7: (Left panel) The bipartite collaboration network G corresponding to the network shown in Figure 5,
where round circles represent authors, squares represent projects and lines indicate the efforts agents invest into
the different projects. (Right panel) The line graph L(G) associated with the collaboration network G in which
each node represents the effort an author invests into different projects. Solid lines indicate nodes sharing a
project while dashed lines indicate nodes with the same author.
graph4 representation of the collaboration network G similar to Bimpikis et al. [2014]. An
example is shown in Figure 7. The network corresponds to the one shown in Figure 5. First
note that the FOC of the effort levels can be written as (see Equation (29) in the proof of
Proposition 2 in Appendix A)
eisδis +
ρδis
β + γ − ρ
p∑
s=1
eisδis −
βδis
β + γ − ρ
∑
j∈Ns
ejsδjs =
1
β + γ − ρ
αiδis.
Then, introducing the matrix
Γis,jk =


ρ if i = j, s 6= k,
−β if i 6= j, s = k,
0 otherwise,
we can write for the vector e of stacked agent-project effort levels, eis, the following(
I+
1
β + γ − ρ
Γ
)
e =
1
β + γ − ρ
α,
where α is a stacked vector with elements αiδis, so that, when the matrix I +
1
β+γ−ρΓ is
invertible, we can write the equilibrium effort levels as follows
e =
1
β + γ − ρ
(
I+
1
β + γ − ρ
Γ
)−1
α.
Observe that the matrix Γ represents a weighted matrix of the line graph L(G) of the bipartite
collaboration network G, where each link between nodes sharing a project has weight −β, and
each link between nodes sharing an author have weight ρ.
4Given a graph G, its line graph L(G) is a graph such that each node of L(G) represents an edge of G, and
two nodes of L(G) are adjacent if and only if their corresponding edges share a common endpoint in G [cf. e.g.
West, 2001].
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4. Conclusion
We have analyzed the equilibrium efforts of agents involved in multiple, possibly overlapping
projects. We show that, given an allocation of researchers to different projects, the Nash
equilibrium can be completely characterized.
We have focussed on two particular specifications, the case of convex separable costs (see
Section 3.1) and the case of a quadratic costs with substitutes or complements (see Section 3.2).
The assumption of a convex separable cost is similar to the model studied in Adams [2006].
The introduction of a quadratic cost with substitutes or complements, depending on the sign of
the parameters φss′ , is similar to Cohen-Cole et al. [2012], and it includes the case of a convex
total cost as a special case when φs,s′ = γ, and the the case of a convex separable cost when
φs,s′ = γδs,s′ . For the special case of only two activities, a theoretical model is studied in Belhaj
and Dero¨ıan [2014], and an empirical analysis is provided in Liu [2014].
Our analysis can be extended along several directions. First, we can allow the returns of an
agent from participating in a project to be split equally among the participants of the project
similar to the models studied in Jackson andWolinsky [1996]; Kandel and Lazear [1992]. Second,
instead of a convex cost, we can introduce a time constraint as in Baumann [2014]; Salonen
[2014]. These extensions and the relation to the current setup are summarized in Table 1.
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return independent of return decreasing with
number of authors number of authors
convex separable
πi =
∑p
s=1
(
Ys −
γ
2 e
2
is
)
δis πi =
∑p
s=1
(
1
ns
Ys −
γ
2 e
2
is
)
δiscost
convex total
πi =
∑p
s=1 Ysδis −
γ
2 (
∑p
s=1 eisδis)
2
πi =
∑p
s=1
1
ns
Ysδis −
γ
2 (
∑p
s=1 eisδis)
2
cost
quadratic cost with
πi =
∑p
s=1 Ysδis −
1
2
∑p
s,s′=1 φs,s′eiseis′δisδis′ πi =
∑p
s=1
1
ns
Ysδis −
1
2
∑p
s,s′=1 φs,s′eiseis′δisδis′substitutes/complements
time
πi =
∑p
s=1 Ysδis s.t.
∑p
s=1 eisδis = 1 πi =
∑p
s=1
1
ns
Ysδis s.t.
∑p
s=1 eisδis = 1constraint
Table 1: The alternative payoff specifications, pii, for i = 1, . . . , n analyzed in Section 3. The output Ys of project s is given in Equation (1). The
case of convex separable costs is studied in Section 3.1. The case of a quadratic costs with substitutes or complements is studied in Section 3.2.
The case of a quadratic cost includes the case of a convex total cost as a special case when φs,s′ = γ, and the case of a convex separable cost when
φs,s′ = γδs,s′ .
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Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The first order condition (FOC) wrt eis is given by
5
∂πi(G, e)
∂eis
=
p∑
s′=1
(
∂Ys′(G, es′)
∂eis
− γeis′
)
δis′ =

αi + β ∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs

 δis − γeisδis = 0, (17)
where we have used the fact that
∂Ys′(G, es′)
∂eis
=
{
αi + β
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs, if s = s
′,
0, otherwise.
From Equation (30) we get
eis =
αi
γ
+
β
γ
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs, (18)
for all projects s in which i is participating. Further, Equation (18) can be written as(
1 +
β
γ
)
eis =
αi
γ
+
β
γ
∑
j∈Ns
ejs, (19)
and
eis =
αi
β + γ
+
β
β + γ
∑
j∈Ns
ejs. (20)
Summation over i ∈ Ns gives
∑
j∈Ns
ejs =
1
β + γ
∑
j∈Ns
αj +
βns
β + γ
∑
j∈Ns
ejs,
and we get (
1−
βns
β + γ
) ∑
j∈Ns
ejs =
1
β + γ
∑
j∈Ns
αj .
Hence ∑
j∈Ns
ejs =
1
γ − β(ns − 1)
∑
j∈Ns
αj.
Inserting into Equation (20) yields
eis =
αi
β + γ
+
β
(β + γ)(γ − β(ns − 1))
∑
j∈Ns
αj. (21)
5Observe that the second order condition (SOC) is given by ∂
2pii(G,e)
∂e2
is
= −γδis ≤ 0.
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This allows us to determine the individual effort eis of agent i in project s. Denoting by α˜i ≡
αi
β+γ
we can write Equation (21) as
eis = α˜i +
β
γ − β(ns − 1)
∑
j∈Ns
α˜j. (22)
Further, denoting by β˜s ≡
β
γ−β(ns−1)
this can be simplified to
eis = α˜i + β˜s
∑
j∈Ns
α˜j. (23)
From Equation (18) we have that
β
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs = γeis − αi,
Inserting into the production function from Equation (1) yields
Ys(G) =
∑
i∈Ns
eis

αi + β
2
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs


=
1
2
∑
i∈Ns
eis (αi + γeis)
=
1
2
∑
i∈Ns
(
αieis + γe
2
is
)
=
1
2
∑
i∈Ns

αi

α˜i + β˜s ∑
j∈Ns
α˜j

+

α˜i + β˜s ∑
j∈Ns
α˜j


2

=
1
2
∑
i∈Ns

αi

 αi
β + γ
+
β
γ − β(ns − 1)
∑
j∈Ns
αj
β + γ

+ γ

 αi
β + γ
+
β
γ − β(ns − 1)
∑
j∈Ns
αj
β + γ


2
 .
(24)
Proof of Proposition 2. The first order condition (FOC) wrt. eis is given by
6
∂πi(G, e)
∂eis
=
p∑
s′=1
δis′
∂Ys′(G, es′)
∂eis
−δis
p∑
s′=1
φs,s′eis′δis′ =

αi + β ∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs

 δis−δis p∑
s′=1
φs,s′eis′δis′ = 0,
(25)
where we have used the fact that
∂Ys′(G, es′)
∂eis
=
{
αi + β
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejs, if s = s
′
0, otherwise.
6Observe that the second order condition (SOC) is given by ∂
2pii(G,e)
∂e2
is
= −φssδis ≤ 0.
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From Equation (25) we get
p∑
s′=1
eis′φs′,sδisδis′ = αiδis + β
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
ejsδjsδis, (26)
for i = 1, . . . , n and s = 1, . . . , p. In the following we denote by
e˜is =
{
eis, if i ∈ Ns,
0, otherwise.
(27)
That is, we define e˜is ≡ δiseis. Then we can write
δis
p∑
s′=1
e˜is′φs′,s = αiδis + βδis
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
e˜js, (28)
In the following we assume that
φss′ =
{
γ, if s′ = s,
ρ, otherwise.
Then we obtain from Equation (28) that
γe˜is + ρδis
p∑
s′ 6=s
e˜is′ = αiδis + βδis
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
e˜js, (29)
which can be written as follows
(γ − ρ)e˜is + ρδis
p∑
s′=1
e˜is′ = αiδis + βδis
∑
j∈Ns\{i}
e˜js.
We can write this as
(β + γ − ρ)e˜is + ρδis
p∑
s′=1
e˜is′ = αiδis + βδis
∑
j∈Ns
e˜js,
and hence
δise˜+s =
β + γ − ρ
β
e˜is −
αi
β
δis +
ρ
β
δise˜i+, (30)
where we have denoted by
e˜+s ≡
∑
j∈Ns
e˜js,
e˜i+ ≡
p∑
s=1
e˜is.
Summing over all i ∈ Ns yields
nse˜+s =
β + γ − ρ
β
e˜+s −
1
β
∑
i∈Ns
αiδis +
ρ
β
∑
i∈Ns
e˜i+.
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Solving for e˜+s gives
e˜+s =
ρ
β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ
∑
i∈Ns
e˜i+ −
1
β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ
∑
i∈Ns
αi. (31)
Next, summation over all projects s involving agent i in Equation (30) yields
p∑
s=1
δise˜+s =
β + γ − ρ
β
p∑
s=1
e˜is −
αi
β
p∑
s=1
δis +
ρ
β
e˜i+
p∑
s=1
δis,
and denoting by
di ≡
p∑
s=1
δis,
we get
p∑
s=1
δise˜+s =
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
β
e˜i+ −
1
β
αidi. (32)
Solving for e˜i+ gives
e˜i+ =
β
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
p∑
s=1
δise˜+s +
1
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
αidi.
Summation over all i ∈ Ns yields
∑
i∈Ns
e˜i+ =
∑
i∈Ns
β
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
p∑
s′=1
δis′ e˜+s′ +
∑
i∈Ns
1
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
αidi. (33)
Inserting Equation (33) into Equation (31) gives
e˜+s =
n∑
i=1
ρβδis
(β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
p∑
s′=1
δis′ e˜+s′
+
n∑
i=1
ραidiδis
(β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
−
1
β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ
n∑
i=1
αiδis. (34)
In the following we denote by
ϕis ≡
ρβδis
(β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
,
µs(α) ≡
n∑
i=1
ραidiδis
(β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
−
1
β(ns − 1) + ρ− γ
n∑
i=1
αiδis.
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Then we can write Equation (34) as follows
e˜+s =
n∑
i=1
ϕis
p∑
s′=1
δis′ e˜+s′ + µs(α)
=
p∑
s′=1
e˜+s′
n∑
i=1
ϕisδis′
=
p∑
s′=1
ωss′ e˜+s′ + µs(α),
where we have denoted by
ωss′ ≡
n∑
i=1
ϕisδis′ .
Further, let ǫ ≡ (e˜+1, . . . , e˜+p)
⊤ and Ω ≡ (ωss′)1≤s,s′≤p, then we can write the above equation
in vector-matrix form as
ǫ = Ωǫ+ µ(α).
That is
(Ip −Ω)ǫ = µ(α).
When the matrix Ip −Ω is invertible, then we can write
ǫ = (Ip −Ω)
−1µ(α). (35)
Next, inserting Equation (35) into Equation (32) gives
p∑
s=1
δisǫs =
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
β
e˜i+ −
1
β
αidi,
so that
e˜i+ =
β
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
p∑
s=1
δisǫs +
1
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
αidi. (36)
Moreover, note that Equation (30) can be written as
e˜is =
β
β + γ − ρ
δise˜+s +
1
β + γ − ρ
αiδis −
ρ
β + γ − ρ
δise˜i+. (37)
Inserting Equations (36) and (35) into Equation (37) gives
e˜is =
β
β + γ − ρ
δisǫs +
1
β + γ − ρ
αiδis
−
ρβ
(β + γ − ρ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
δis
p∑
s′=1
ǫs′δis′
−
ρ
(β + γ − ρ)(β + γ + ρ(di − 1))
δisαidi. (38)
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Equation (38) can be written as follows
e˜is =
δis
β + γ − ρ
[
βǫs + αi −
ρ
β + γ + ρ(di − 1)
(
p∑
s′=1
δis′ǫs′ + αidi
)]
. (39)
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